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SEC Enforcement in FY 2026: “Less Is More,” or Simply Less?

The Commission’s annual statistics confirm a historic contraction in enforcement activity. Market participants should welcome a more disciplined approach to enforcement, but they should not mistake lower numbers for either regulatory retreat or proof that the new model is working.

The Securities and Exchange Commission’s fiscal year 2026 enforcement statistics put hard numbers behind what securities practitioners have observed for much of the past year: the SEC is bringing substantially fewer enforcement cases.

On November 10, 2026, the SEC reported that it filed 348 enforcement actions in FY 2026, including only 235 standalone actions. It obtained approximately $1.095 billion in monetary relief, consisting of $752 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest and $343 million in civil penalties. Approximately $235 million of the disgorgement was deemed satisfied through a separate non-SEC proceeding. The Commission nevertheless distributed approximately $731 million to more than 250,000 harmed investors.

The direction of travel is unmistakable.

The SEC brought 303 standalone actions in FY 2025 and 431 in FY 2024. Thus, the 235 standalone actions brought in FY 2026 represent approximately a 22% decline from FY 2025 and a 45% decline in only two years. Compared with FY 2023, when the SEC brought 501 standalone cases, FY 2026 activity was down by more than half.

That is not a statistical blip. It is a material contraction in the enforcement footprint of the federal government’s principal securities regulator.

Whether that contraction represents welcome discipline, institutional underperformance, or some combination of the two is more complicated.

The Numbers Are Low, Even After Giving the SEC the Benefit of Its Argument

Chairman Paul S. Atkins has been explicit that raw enforcement statistics should not be treated as the measure of a successful enforcement program. In announcing FY 2026 results, he stated that enforcement actions and financial remedies are important indicators of activity, but “are not the only or most telling measures.

As a matter of principle, that is difficult to dispute.

Indeed, defense lawyers have spent years criticizing exactly the opposite mentality: regulation by enforcement, questionable liability theories employed to establish policy outside the rulemaking process, industry-wide sweeps designed largely to produce large numbers of settlements, and corporate penalties that sometimes seemed disconnected from either investor harm or deterrence.

The current Commission has expressly rejected that model.

Its FY 2025 announcement accused the prior Commission of using enforcement resources to pursue “media headlines and run up numbers,” particularly through off-channel communications cases, aggressive crypto litigation and other matters the current Commission regarded as insufficiently focused on demonstrable investor harm. The Commission noted that since FY 2022 its predecessor had brought 95 off-channel communications actions producing $2.3 billion in penalties, despite what the current Commission characterized as an absence of direct investor harm.

There is considerable merit to the proposition that case count is not case quality.

But that proposition cannot do unlimited work. At some point the magnitude of the decline itself becomes relevant.

The SEC brought 501 standalone actions in FY 2023, 431 in FY 2024, 303 in FY 2025, and now 235 in FY 2026. In three fiscal years, standalone enforcement activity has fallen by approximately 53%.

That is sufficiently dramatic that “we are focusing on quality rather than quantity” cannot be the end of the inquiry.

The Composition of the FY 2026 Numbers Makes the Decline More Striking

Even the 235 standalone-action figure deserves some unpacking.

According to an analysis of the SEC’s accompanying statistics, FY 2026 standalone matters included 79 investment adviser/investment company cases, 63 securities-offering cases, 38 insider-trading cases, 23 issuer-reporting/audit and accounting matters, 16 broker-dealer matters, seven market-manipulation matters, six miscellaneous matters and three public-finance matters. No FCPA cases appeared in the annual classification table.

More significantly, the apparently robust investment-adviser number was heavily influenced by two coordinated sweeps involving entities accused of filing false Forms ADV to create the appearance that they were legitimate U.S. investment advisers. Those matters represented 45 of the 79 investment-adviser/investment-company actions. On that analysis, removing those coordinated cases would produce a striking decline in more traditional adviser enforcement activity.

The same point applies to monetary relief.

The SEC reported $1.095 billion in FY 2026 monetary relief. But $235 million was deemed satisfied in a separate non-SEC proceeding, resulting in roughly $860 million after that adjustment.

Comparison with FY 2025 requires care because last year’s extraordinary $17.9 billion headline number was dominated by judgments associated with the long-running Stanford matter. The SEC itself acknowledged last year that after excluding deemed-satisfied amounts and the Stanford judgments, FY 2025 monetary relief was approximately $2.7 billion, consisting of $1.4 billion in disgorgement and prejudgment interest and $1.3 billion in penalties.

On a more apples-to-apples adjusted basis, FY 2026 monetary remedies appear to have declined dramatically as well.

For defense practitioners, that is important. Monetary remedies are notoriously volatile because one enormous judgment can distort an entire year’s numbers. Case counts are imperfect too, but a contraction occurring simultaneously across case filings and monetary remedies is harder to dismiss as statistical noise.

The Better Defense-Side View: This Is a Welcome Correction, but the Burden of Proof Has Shifted to the SEC

There is a temptation to frame the statistics politically: the prior Commission was “aggressive,” while the current Commission is “business friendly.” That description is too crude to be particularly useful.

A more defensible interpretation is that the Atkins Commission is attempting to change what constitutes an enforcement-worthy case.

From the defense bar’s perspective, much of that recalibration is healthy.

Enforcement should not substitute for notice-and-comment rulemaking. Novel interpretations of statutory provisions should not be transformed into de facto industry standards merely because regulated entities cannot afford the business consequences of litigating against the federal government. And penalties should bear a defensible relationship to culpability, investor harm, cooperation and deterrence rather than the agency’s desire to announce another record enforcement year.

The Commission’s revisions to the Enforcement Manual, including changes designed to standardize the Wells process and clarify how cooperation affects penalty recommendations, are potentially meaningful reforms. So is the SEC’s rescission of Rule 202.5(e), its longstanding “no-deny” settlement policy.

But an agency cannot establish that its enforcement program is superior merely by explaining why statistics should not matter.

If the SEC wants the regulated community to accept “quality over quantity” as its new measuring stick, it ultimately must demonstrate the quality.

That means showing that its investigations are faster and better targeted; that marginal investigations are closed earlier; that meritorious cases reach disposition more efficiently; that cooperation materially changes outcomes; and that staff resources previously consumed by low-value sweeps are actually being redirected toward significant fraud.

The FY 2026 report contains indicators of such a transition, but not yet proof of success.

The SEC Is Building an Enforcement Program That May Be Smaller but More Technologically Capable

Market participants therefore should resist the comforting but dangerous inference that lower filings mean dramatically lower investigative risk.

The agency spent a substantial portion of its FY 2026 announcement describing its future enforcement infrastructure.

It created a Retail Fraud Working Group aimed at Ponzi schemes, offering frauds, impersonation scams, broker-dealer misconduct, false filings and manipulation affecting retail investors. The SEC says that effort already has produced more than a dozen new investigations.

It also established a Financial Reporting and Accounting Unit bringing together lawyers and accountants specializing in accounting standards, internal controls, books and records, issuer disclosure and auditing.

Perhaps most consequentially, Enforcement created an Office of Super Intelligence and Analytics that the agency says will deploy advanced analytical tools for anomaly detection, document and transcript review, blockchain analysis and financial-flow analysis.

Those initiatives suggest an enforcement model in which fewer matters may originate from broad thematic sweeps while more originate from data suggesting actual misconduct.

That would be good policy. It also could create significantly greater risk for the firms and individuals who fall on the wrong side of the analytics.

Individual Liability Has Not Gone Away

The strongest warning in FY 2026 may concern individuals.

Approximately two-thirds of the SEC’s standalone actions included charges against at least one individual, continuing an emphasis evident in FY 2025.

Insider-trading enforcement actually increased. The Commission brought 38 standalone insider-trading actions in FY 2026, compared with 31 in FY 2025, making insider trading the third-largest standalone category.

This distinction matters particularly for officers, directors, investment professionals, lawyers, accountants and other gatekeepers.

The current philosophy appears considerably less interested in extracting a large corporate penalty simply to communicate regulatory displeasure, but it is not similarly reluctant to pursue individuals when the staff believes it can establish intentional misconduct.

The practical message therefore is not “less enforcement.” It is more accurately “more selective enforcement.”

That distinction should affect defense strategy.

Cooperation May Finally Be Becoming More Than a Talking Point

Another development deserves particular attention from companies confronted with an SEC investigation.

For years, defense counsel have faced uncertainty when advising clients whether extraordinary cooperation would actually produce a measurable enforcement benefit. The SEC routinely encouraged self-reporting and cooperation, but the precise return could be difficult to predict.

FY 2026 provides some useful data points.

The Commission highlighted several matters in which it imposed no civil penalty in light of cooperation or remediation. In another insider-trading matter, it imposed a penalty equal to only half the individual’s illicit profits after taking account of voluntary self-reporting and cooperation. Conversely, the Commission cited a $20 million penalty against UBS Financial Services for deficiencies it concluded had not been remediated promptly, and a $100 million penalty against Western Asset Management based on failures to detect and prevent alleged cherry-picking despite warning signs.

For defense counsel, that is potentially much more important than the overall case count.

If the Commission is genuinely willing to provide predictable charging or penalty credit for early self-reporting, meaningful cooperation and remediation, corporate clients have something concrete to evaluate when misconduct surfaces.

The challenge will be whether that approach is applied consistently across Enforcement offices and matters.

What Market Participants Should Take From FY 2026

The decline in enforcement should provide some comfort, but not complacency.

First, technical violations lacking identifiable investor harm appear less likely than they were several years ago to generate large-scale enforcement campaigns. The wholesale off-channel communications sweeps of the prior Commission are unlikely to provide the template for this Commission’s enforcement program.

Second, genuine fraud remains dangerous territory. Offering fraud, Ponzi schemes, insider trading, financial-reporting fraud, market manipulation, misuse of customer assets and undisclosed conflicts remain firmly within the Enforcement Division’s conception of its core mission.

Third, investment advisers should be particularly cautious about interpreting the statistics as deregulation. The Commission specifically highlighted misappropriation, conflicts, undisclosed fees, valuation issues, private-fund misconduct and Custody Rule violations among its continuing priorities.

Fourth, cooperation and remediation should now be evaluated at the very beginning of a potential enforcement matter. The developing enforcement framework makes the timing of self-reporting and remediation potentially outcome-determinative.

Finally, companies should distinguish enforcement filings from investigations. A reduced number of filed cases does not establish a corresponding decline in subpoenas, informal inquiries, whistleblower investigations or internally generated leads. Indeed, the approximately 26,000 whistleblower tips received in FY 2026, combined with the agency’s new analytic capabilities, provide ample raw material for future investigations.

The Bottom Line

For the defense bar, there is much to welcome in the Commission’s stated enforcement philosophy.

A securities regulator that chooses cases according to investor harm, evidentiary strength and established law rather than publicity value is preferable to an agency that measures success largely by how many cases it files and how many billions of dollars it announces in annual penalties.

But FY 2026’s numbers are sufficiently weak that philosophy alone cannot explain them away.

Standalone enforcement actions have fallen from 501 in FY 2023 to 235 in FY 2026, a decline of more than half. Monetary remedies fell substantially as well.

Perhaps this is the necessary trough accompanying a fundamental restructuring of Enforcement. The Commission points to new specialized units, technological capabilities, procedural reforms and a more carefully selected investigative docket. If those investments produce stronger fraud cases, quicker investigations and more rational resolutions over the next several years, FY 2026 eventually may look like a transition year rather than an underperforming one.

But that case remains to be made.

For now, the most sensible conclusion for securities-market participants is more nuanced: the SEC Enforcement Division is plainly less active, but it is not necessarily less dangerous. Its docket is smaller, its philosophy is changing, and its institutional machinery is being rebuilt around fraud, individual accountability, data analytics and demonstrable investor harm.

For defense counsel, that may actually make the cases the Commission does choose to bring more consequential. And for the Commission, FY 2027 will begin to answer the question left unresolved by these remarkably low statistics: whether “less is more,” or whether less is simply less.

Richard A. Levan

RICHARD A. LEVAN is a partner at Dailey LLP specializing in securities industry matters.

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